Issue №005
x3Web AIWeb · AI Launch ↗
№ 005 / Security
Pre-TGE · prep mode

Boring on purpose.
Paranoid by design.

No audits to publish yet, no bounty pool funded, no production money in flight — because we haven't launched the surfaces that need them. This page describes how we'll get there, and how to reach us when you find something we missed.

§ 01 · Architecture

Non-custodial. By construction.

Keys
Stay with the user

Every on-chain action is signed by the user's own wallet. Bots execute under scoped session keys (EIP-7702 / Solana session-key pattern) with explicit allow-lists for programs, methods, recipient sets, per-tx caps, and TTL. No private key ever leaves the client.

Signer
Reproducible & open

The session-key signer ships as a tagged release with SHA-256 manifest. Builds are reproducible from source, signed with Sigstore / cosign, and verifiable against the published digest before install. Self-hosting supported.

Treasury
Multi-sig + timelock

All admin / upgrade actions are gated by an N-of-M multi-sig (hardware-key signers) behind a 48 h timelock. Signer set, threshold, and timelock parameters are published on-chain at TGE and any change runs through the same gate.

Contracts
Verified at deploy

Source verified on the canonical explorer at deploy. Deterministic build pipeline. Upgradeability via transparent-proxy pattern with timelocked admin. External audit commissioned before $X3AI TGE — firm, scope, and report linked here when signed off.

§ 02 · Infrastructure

How the rails are built. Down to the wire.

Network & edge
TLS 1.3 · HSTS · CSP

All traffic terminates on a Cloudflare edge with TLS 1.3 only, HSTS preload, OCSP stapling, and a strict Content-Security-Policy (script/style/img/connect explicit allow-lists, nonce-based inline). Bot-management + L3/L4 + L7 DDoS protection. WAF rules tuned for the generator surface.

Hosting & isolation
Multi-region · isolated

Application runs on Vercel (edge functions + serverless) across US/EU regions with automatic failover. RPC traffic routed through Helius (Solana) and Alchemy / dedicated nodes (EVM) with per-app rate limits. Generator workers run in isolated sandboxes — no shared file system across jobs.

Secrets
Vault · short-lived

No secret ever lives in a git repo, an env file, or a build log. All credentials are issued from a managed vault (Doppler / Vercel encrypted env), scoped per environment, rotated on a 90-day cadence, and revoked on any departure. Model-provider keys are short-lived and per-request scoped where the provider supports it.

Data at rest
AES-256 · encrypted

All databases (Postgres on Neon / Supabase) and object storage are encrypted at rest with AES-256, daily point-in-time backups, and a documented restore drill. PII is minimized — we collect a wallet address and prompt content, nothing more.

§ 03 · Application security

Hardened in the boring places. Where it counts.

Auth
SIWE / SIWS · sessions

Wallet-based auth via Sign-In with Ethereum / Solana. Short-lived JWT sessions (httpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Lax) with refresh rotation. No passwords stored, ever.

Input handling
Schema-validated

Every API request is parsed through a Zod schema. Server-rendered output is contextually escaped. Generator output is sandbox-rendered (sandboxed iframe with srcdoc + restricted permissions) so untrusted prompts can't pivot into our origin.

Rate limits
Per-wallet · per-IP

Token-bucket limits at the edge (Cloudflare) and at the application layer (Upstash Redis). Per-wallet, per-IP, and per-route. Abusive prompts hit a model-side moderation pass before generation.

RBAC & access
Least privilege

Production access is SSO + hardware-key MFA only. No human has standing read on user data — break-glass access is JIT-approved and logged. Service accounts are scoped per function with explicit IAM grants.

Dependencies
Pinned · scanned

Lockfile-pinned. Renovate bot opens upgrade PRs. Dependabot + Socket scan every PR for known CVEs and supply-chain risk (typosquats, install-time scripts). High-severity findings block merge.

CI / CD
Signed releases

CI on GitHub Actions with OIDC-issued cloud creds (no long-lived tokens). Release artifacts are SHA-pinned and signed with Sigstore cosign. Production deploys require a PR review and a green security check.

§ 04 · Operations

Logged, alerted, drilled.

Logging
Structured · centralized

Structured JSON logs from every service shipped to a central sink (Axiom / Logtail). 30-day hot retention, 1-year cold. PII scrubbed at the source. Request-scoped trace IDs for end-to-end correlation.

Monitoring
Sentry · uptime · on-call

Sentry for app errors, BetterStack for uptime, custom Grafana boards for RPC latency & queue depth. PagerDuty rotation, 15-min response SLO for sev-1, public status page at status.x3web.ai when live.

Incident response
Playbooks · post-mortems

Written runbooks for key failure modes (RPC outage, model-provider outage, suspected key compromise). Blameless post-mortems on every sev-1, published within 7 days.

§ 05 · Disclosure & bounty

Find a hole. Get credit.

Coordinated disclosure
security@x3web.ai

PGP key on this page at launch. We acknowledge within 24 h, triage within 72 h, and agree a fix + disclosure window with you. Public credit when patched, unless you'd rather stay anonymous.

PlannedAt $X3AI TGE
Public bounty

A tiered bounty on a recognized platform launches with TGE — paid in stablecoin, reward bands published then. No pool is funded yet; until then, responsible reporters are recognized in the launch notes.

§ 06 · Compliance · planned
SOC 2 · planned post-TGE GDPR · in scope CCPA · in scope Encryption at rest · standard practice

No certifications are claimed yet. Anything listed above is on the work plan, not on the wall. Real certificates and scopes will appear here once issued.